Abstract Abstract L'acte surréalistite le plus simple consiste, revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la rue et à tirer au hasard, tant qu'on peut, dans la foule. (Breton, Manifestes 155) It is difficult not to feel uncomfortable reading this well-known passage now, in light of recent events. And yet, isn't this perhaps precisely the reason such a text demands our attention? By studying similar passages in Breton's writing, we find that it is through a very particular use of language that the alienated subject acquires a sense of empowerment; and more importantly, that the force of such a discourse is extremely limited-dependent on a destructive relation to alterity-precisely where it promises liberation. Through close textual analysis, we observe that the "terrorist" writer in fact ends up reproducing, and indeed exacerbating the very process of devaluation he has set out to transcend. As the writer increasingly fixates on oppressive institutions and conventions, the insistence of his invective-a repetition compulsion we find establishing itself in the very prosodic structures of the text-generates a language which, instead of opening out onto new possibilities for meaning, produces semantic homogeneity.
embraced by the writer than in the "intensity" with which his discourse moves through these ideas, in continual revolution, we would suggest that it is also to this level of the Bretonian text (and not the particular positions he holds at any given time) that the critical gaze should be turned if we are to better understand the "pivotal" nature of the writer's work.' How might the unique affective force of such a discourse come to turn against the writer and his project-the attraction of new "revolutionaries?" At a time when the avant-garde gesture of revolt has become so ingrained in artistic expression that it is hardly possible as such any more, a convention itself, such a phenomenon would seem to merit close attention.
For all of the excessive hyperbole which at times leads us to dismiss Hugo, the first citation reflects one of the poet's most dangerous legacies to modern poetry: the belief, not simply that poetic language can affect reality, but further, that it is capable of the most dramatic, and indeed violent transformations of the latter. This is not to suggest that such texts are literally dangerous. To our knowledge, none of Andre Breton's admirers actually fired into crowds,
for instance-what he once formulated as the most basic Surrealist act: "L'acte surrealiste le plus simple consiste, revolvers aux poings, a descendre dans la rue et a tirer au hasard, tant qu'on peut, dans la foule" 'The simplest Surrealist act consists of dashing down into the street, pistol in hand, and firing blindly, as fast as you can pull the trigger, into the crowd,' (Manifestoes 156, Seaver 125). Indeed, we would suggest that, on the contrary, the potential effect of such texts on actual events is more often diminished; that literary violence is ultimately a danger to itself, and the ideas it is intended to express. In close readings of "revolutionary" texts, we find that transgressive language often comes to undermine the production of new value for which it is employed, through what we would identify as an economic crisis in expression; overtaken by a kind of "inflation" in expressive force, such a discourse proliferates through a continual devaluation of . . . discourse ("Ce sont toutes les valeurs intellectuelles brimees, toutes les idees morales en &route, tous les bienfaits de la vie frappees de corruption, indiscernables" 'It is a matter of all intellectual values being persecuted, all moral ideas falling to pieces, all the benefits of life being condemned to corruption and becoming indiscernible; [Breton in Position 19, Seaver 2161) .
Before turning to these texts, however, we should point out that this phenomenon is all the more pertinent for being the result of another, more recent development in the identity of the modern writer, evoked in the plaintive lines that follow Hugo's confident assertion, above. If Surrealism to a certain extent actualizes the revolution conceived by the young Hugo, with its full-scale attack on those conventions which restrain authentic expression, why is Robert Desnos, the poet who in Breton's opinion most embodies this freedom, embroiled in an internal conflict-precisely where Surrealist doctrine locates a creative source liberated from external restraint (i. In the following pages, I have attempted to show the modern poet "in" this endless quest-that is to say, in the very medium, or "matter" of language in which the latter takes place. Key texts, where Breton elaborates Surrealism's esthetic and political position, reveal a crucial blind spot in the practice of avant-garde literature: an inability to recognize textual processes that not only fail to invest language with new value, but actually produce the opposite result: an over-production of the signifier itself. The "lover of homonyms" cannot prevent himself from continuing, and indeed exacerbating, the very tendency to excess he attempts to destroy.
Despite his generally anarchic tendencies, Breton clearly adheres to certain elements of the literary tradition-that myth of the poetic subject, for instance, in which the latter is alienated from society, singled out by destiny: We first note, especially after underlining them, that the invective terms play a key role in the prosodic structure of the passage: appearing in pairs at the end of the phrases, these resonant terms clearly create accents, or instances of intensity in the text: "plate suffisance" => "pieces insultantes" => "confinant a la sottise."6 These phonetic patterns are not of course solely responsible for this effect, but are playing on, amplifying the affective charge such terms produce on the semantic level; a concentrated effect that regular discourse cannot achieve in individual units of expression. As Timothy There is nothing better than an obscene word for perceiving the limits of a phenomenological linguistics faced with the heterogeneous and complex architectronics of significance. . . . the obscene word mobilizes the signifying resources of the subject, permitting it to cross through the membrane of meaning where consciousness holds it, connecting it to gesturality, kinesthesia, the drives' body, the movement of rejection and appropriation of the other. Then, it is neither object, transcendental signified, nor signifier available to a neutralized consciousness.
... By reconstituting them ("these jubilatory dramas"), and this on the very level of language, literature achieves it cathartic effects. (Desire 143) And yet, shouldn't we be suspicious of these supposedly objective, theoretical texts, in encountering the same absolute language we have observed in Breton's writing ("Inoffensive language . . . will not achieve a deep level of intensity; only a curse word will do it. Cursing's unique emotional shading is essential"; "There is nothing better than an obscene word"; "it is neither ...nor . . .")? Can any one type of discourse actually have such a status-entirely other than conventional discourses, enabling the subject once again to experience what "neutralized consciousness" is no longer capable of-or do such unequivocal valorizations point to the same concept of transgression we have suggested is problematic for Breton? More importantly: allowing that a given term can produce such an effect, can this level of expressive intensity be maintained when, as we find in Breton's writing, such terms are continuously repeated-and to such a degree they could be said to constitute the discourse itself, no longer "other than" anything else?
But the invective discourse involves another, more serious And indeed, in looking more closely at Breton's most polemical texts, we find that the iterative structure of such passages reveals not only a language that definitively fails to reach its "destination," but, more problematic, a writer increasingly and uncontrollably "implicated" in the reproduction of this failure; something like the "tar baby" of Joel Chandler Harris' famous tale, the invective discourse increasingly joins the writing subject to the hated object, only exacerbating, paradoxically, the desire to destroy the latter. It seems appropriate that we find Breton himself identifying this very phenomenon . . . in another writer. Following the dissen-
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005] (Manifoestes 218, Seaver 184 ). Breton's insight in identifying this economy of expression, and his simultaneous inability to see his own participation in the latter, is striking. For if we return to one of the passages cited earlier, we find that it is precisely through such language that the poet derives his own "lyricism." Once the possibility of the latter has been threatened by the opposition ("l'attitude realiste . . . (est) hostile a tout essor" 'the realistic attitude . . . (is) hostile to any . . . flight'), Breton can then produce such a tone in the text-not through the positive, affirmative gesture associated with the lyrical, but through a repeated identification of what inhibits that gesture. In elaborating, reiterating his condemnation of this other discourse ("ces livres ridicules, ces pieces insultantes" 'these ridiculous books, these insulting plays'), it is not so much his enemy that produces a "degraded" language, as he claims, but Breton himself . . . as he "declaims": "elle est faite de mediocrite, de haine, et de plate suffisance. C'est elle qui engendre aujourd'hui ces livres ridicules, ces pieces insultantes" 'it is made up of mediocrity, hate, and dull conceit. It is this attitude which today gives birth to these ridiculous books, these insulting plays').
This blind spot in the writer's insight-identifying "degraded" modes of expression and simultaneously reproducing them-suggests a largely autonomous, self-generating process of composition (and it should be remembered that, being expository and polemical in nature, these particular texts are not intended as "automatic writing"). In another passage, where Breton even more explicitly identifies this process of devaluation, we again observe his own text perpetuating the very language he critiques. The finality of each hyperbole is betrayed by the enthusiastic pronouncement of "filth" ... le meme ceremonial exterieur sous lequel se distingue tout de suite la survivance du signe a la chose signifiee. Ce sont toutes les valeurs intellectuelles brimees, toutes les idees morales en deroute, tous les bienfaits de la vie frappees de corruption, indiscernables. La souillure de l'argent a tout recouvert. Ce que designe le mot patrie, ou le mot justice, ou le mot devoir nous est devenu etranger. Une plaie beante s'ouvre sous nos yeux; nous sommes temoins qu'un grand mal continue a se faire, auquel it ne nous appartient tout d'abord que de mesurer notre participation.
... the same outer ceremony beneath which it is immediately obvious that the sign survives the thing signified. It is a matter of all intellectual values being persecuted, all moral ideas falling to pieces, all the benefits of life being condemned to corruption and becoming indiscernible. The contamination of money has covered everything over. What is designated by the word fatherland, or the word justice, or the word duty has become foreign to us. A gaping wound opens before our eyes; we are witnesses of the fact that great evil continues to be perpetuated, and our first task is merely to measure our participation in it:' (Position 19, emphasis mine, Seaver 216) The inherent contradiction of the poetic "terror" becomes visible here, more than ever; the "gaping wound" 'tine plaie beante' which most threatens the integrity and vitality of language is in fact here, in this text, between the latter's stated, moral project, and the actual language of degradation that progressively appears there, as if unbidden ( "un grand mal continue a se faire" 'great evil continues to be perpetuated'). Breton continues:
. . . this frightful delirium of a dying man: here dogs are being blessed . a bit farther on they are seeking to awaken the old and sordid instinct for mob lynching, against a man whom abysmal social contradictions, more treacherous for him than for another, have pushed into committing a misdeed or a crime. All Isn't the writer guilty of the very perversity he is busy condemning in the bourgeoisie ("cet affreux &sir de moribond" 'this frightful delirium of a dying man')? Hasn't he already given up the one right he claims ("il ne nous appartient tout d'abord que de mesurer notre participation" 'our first task is merely to measure our participation in it'), further opening this wound by not measuring his participation, despite himself, in the economy he condemns?
Inconsistencies in Breton's argument itself, while certainly worthy of attention-the essential equivalence between the violence the writer condemns, for instance ("l'instinct de lynchage des foules" `the old and sordid instinct for mob lynching') and that which he promotes ("le The inability sufficiently to express the absolute nature of his revolt leads Breton so far as to attack, or at least threaten . . . his reader (!): "Qui n'a pas eu, au moths une fois, envie d'en finir de la sorte avec le petit systeme d'avilissement et de cretinisation en vigueur a sa place toute marquee dans cette foule, ventre a hauteur de canon" 'Anyone who, at least once in his life, has not dreamed of thus putting an end to the petty system of debasement and cretinization in effect has a well-defined place in that crowd, with his belly at barrel level:9 While it could be argued that this final gesture in fact reflects the ultimate integrity of Breton's revolt, pushing the ideal of anarchy to its limit, I would suggest that it reveals, on the contrary, the ultimate fatality of such a discourse. For the most fundamental discursive structure necessary to communication is jeopardized here-the addressee is alienated, not simply through the latter's assimilation to the mob targeted by the text, but also by the larger problem of expression manifested in this gesture: in observing how such passages originate, ostensibly, in an objective reflection on society, while concluding in emphatic, absolute subjectivity (Breton has eliminated the possibility of our holding any position other than his own), aren't we forced to question the writer's most basic intentions concerning the creative act? Was the desire for personal catharsis the only (if unconscious) end of the "terrorist" act from the beginning, whether it produces or destroys? Even if no one is left listening? Notes 1 "Breton remained faithful to an image of himself as revolutionary and of Surrealism as a total and permanent revolt against accepted judgments and habits. Through the most obvious inconsistencies, this fidelity lends an undeniable unity to all his work" (10); "It is partly this intensity of feeling that convinces him (rightly) that he can speak to and be heard by all the young people who refusent le pli, that is, who refuse to take the crease 15 of ordinariness, to be molded according to the worn-out ideas of family, country, and religion that it is the Surrealists' purpose to subvert ... (26) . speculation.... All the desertions, all the abdications, all the betrayals possible will not prevent us from putting an end to this bullshit"; "He was certainly worthy of the bourgeois world, with its idea of responsibility that, still firmly rooted in opinion, and however unclear, alone continues to paralyze the odious machinery of repression," Breton, Position 159, emphasis mine.
7 An ideal word choice for Breton's discourse, since it denotes both "dogs," one of his preferred invective terms, as witnessed in previous citations ("la vie des chiens" 'a dog's life, "ici, l'on benit des chiens" 'here dogs are being blessed'), and the multitude of "others" he despises: "CANAILLE: Ramassis de gens meprisables ou consideres comme tels. => pegre, populace, racaille," 'CANAILLE: Gathering of people who are contemptible, or considered as such. => underworld, rabble, riffraff,' (Robert). It is also significant that this term reflects a certain class consciousness that is hardly in accordance with the poet's political position (among the antonyms listed in the Robert, we find: "aristocratie" 'aristocracy, 'convenable' "proper," and "distingue" `distinguished'), and that, as an adjective, it denotes, "Vulgaire, avec une pointe de perversite," 'Vulgar, with a touch of perversity.'
